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Abstract 
This paper analyses the institutional changes to European Union diplomacy constituted by the 
Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service. These changes were meant to 
solve serious problems of horizontal and vertical incoherence in EU diplomacy that were caused by 
the  network  organization  of  EU  diplomacy  and  the  divide  between  supranational  and 
intergovernmental policy areas. 
The  approach  is  based  on  three  separate  analytical  dimensions.  The  first  focuses  on  the 
reorganisation of the decision-making and policy-planning structures in Brussels, where particularly 
the new double-hatted post of High Representative and Vice-president of the Commission represents a 
watershed in EU internal coordination. Secondly, the constitution of the network of EU actors that act 
internationally is analysed, with special attention given to the now even more central role of the EU 
Delegations to third states, around which EU diplomatic representation has been streamlined. The 
picture is more muddied with respect to the EU’s participation in international organisations, with the 
main obstacles to a more coherent EU diplomacy remains: The clash between the EU’s non-state 
nature  and  the  internal  law  of  international  organizations.  Thirdly,  it  is  argued  that  the  recent 
institutional  changes  are  indicative  of  a  strategic  shift  in  EU  diplomacy,  away  from  traditional 
transformative objectives of a structural nature and towards the consolidation of a more traditional 
Westphalian paradigm of the defence of interests in competition with other actors.  
Keywords: European Union, European External Action Service, Diplomacy, Lisbon 
Treaty 
1. Introduction 
Although  political  disagreement  among  Member  States  continues  to  be  the  key 
restriction to an effective EU international role and, in consequence, to its diplomacy towards 
third states, it is necessary to distinguish disagreement over the political content of EU foreign 
policy  from  disagreement  over  the  organization  of  the  EU  as  a  diplomatic  actor  and  the 
decision-making procedures in different policy areas. When there is no agreement on the 
political content of EU foreign policy, the organization of diplomacy matters little, since there 
is  no  common  political  position  to  represent.  In  contrast,  when  in  the  EU  there  is  an 
increasing  political  agreement  on  foreign  policy  content,  including  an  ever  stronger 
perception that the EU should be acting on behalf of its Member States, the organization of its 
diplomacy becomes vital to effectively represent the existing political agreement. With the 
acceleration  of  the  integration  process  after  the  1980s,  the  increasing  political  agreement 
within the EU could not be translated into effective international agency because there was no 
clarity about who should act in which areas, a fact which has led to bureaucratic turf wars and 
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unproductive internal ideological debates.
1 This way, the establishment of the EEAS and the 
associated institutional innovation contained in the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as a logical 
consequence of increased political agreement within the EU over foreign policy substance, in 
particular the necessity making the EU an effective international actor. 
Furthermore,  the  recent  institutional   innovations  contain  the  provisions  for  the 
establishment  of  a  feedback  loop,  in  the sense  that  intensified cooperation  in  the new 
structures will imply a socialization of EU officials and Member State representatives that 
will contribute to strengthening and generalising the perception of the necessity for EU action 
as well as general political agreement. To the extent that the EEAS is perceived as successful 
and a good representative by the Member States, whether in negotiations with Iran over its 
nuclear programme or in the daily management of relationships with Russia and China, this 
will in itself also contribute to a greater consensus on the necessity for concerted EU action. 
The question of the reorganisation of EU diplomacy is therefore also about th e identity and 
nature of the EU as a political entity as well as the status of its Member States as sovereign 
states.  
The question of EU diplomacy is this way also relevant to broader questions about the 
contemporary transformation of diplomacy and the so vereign nature of the states. As a  sui 
generis post-modern political form
2 characterised by flexibility and uncertainty,
3 the EU is a 
non-state and non-sovereign international actor, radically different from the Westphalian 
state, which means that EU diplomacy cannot be assumed to share important characteristics 
with state diplomacy. With the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), the EU has arguably undertaken the most significant reorganisation 
of its diplomacy since the beginning of the process of European integration. Apart from the 
direct impact of institutional changes, another important question thus becomes whether the 
institutional innovations mean that the EU is adapting its international strategy to bec ome 
more state-like as an international actor, or whether its diplomacy retains its unique post -
sovereign and networked nature. 
This paper starts out by briefly considering the state of EU diplomacy before the 
Lisbon Treaty, to identify the problems inadeq uate performance that motivated the changes 
culminating with the creation of the EEAS. The third section will consider the central 
administration of EU diplomacy by the institutions in Brussels, whereas the fourth will 
consider EU diplomacy on the ground i n third states and in international organisation. The 
fifth section will contain an interpretation of EU diplomacy and the changes that the Lisbon 
Treaty and the EEAS represent in the EU’s overall international strategy. The final section 6 
contains the conclusions of this study.  
2. EU diplomacy before Lisbon: The need for reform 
To understand the present configuration and functioning of the European Union as a 
diplomatic actor it is important to note that this the phenomenon of the EU diplomacy is by no 
means new but can be understood as the result of the political process that has developed over 
several decades and the gradual change in the attitudes of the Member States towards the 
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global  actorness  of  the  EU.
4  Probably  the  most  important  event  prior  to  t he  formal 
establishment  of  the  EEAS  occurred  when  the  project  to  create  a  European  Defence 
Community was finally abandoned in 1954. This nodal point in the history of European 
integration effectively excluded security and defence matters from the agenda of  European 
integration until the end of the Cold War and meant that bifurcation of the foreign policy of 
the EU and its institutional predecessors, where economic matters fell under community 
competence, whereas ‘political’ matters and those with defence implications were excluded 
from community action institutionalised as the first and second pillars of EU, respectively, 
with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. This bifurcation means that the EU institutions have 
different roles and make decisions by different procedures depending on the policy area, with 
the second pillar continuing to be based on consensus. This bifurcation continues to be the 
most notable characteristic of the EU as an international actor, together with the coexistence 
of EU foreign policy and diplomacy with parallel activities of the individual Member States. 
The persistence of this differentiated integration across policy areas means that EU 
foreign policy and diplomatic representation is inherently complex and that the roles and 
forms of interaction among the different EU institutions vary with the political issue area. 
This has given rise to serious problems of horizontal coherence in EU foreign policy (between 
the activities of different institutions and between different policy areas), as rivalry between 
especially the Commission and the Council Secretariat has been inevitable.
5 Furthermore, this 
lack of coherence has not been helped by the lack of precision in the EU treaties on the precise 
competences of each institution as for foreign po licy and diplomatic representation. 
Apart from the problems  of  horizontal  coherence  that  have  always  plagued  EU 
diplomacy to the extent of constituting a serious impediment to the impact of its foreign 
policy,  another  principal  obstacle  to  achieving  global   influence  is  undoubtedly  the 
combination of a lack of wide -spread agreement on foreign policy issues, coupled with a 
decision-making procedure in the area of the second-pillar issue areas of the CFSP and CSDP 
based on consensus. As the individual EU Member States retain full competences in traditional 
foreign policy and security matters. This means that any EU foreign policy coexists with the 28 
individual foreign policies of the Member States, and the scene has thus also been set for serious 
problems of vertical coherence, i.e. between EU-level policies and those of individual Member 
States.  Furthermore,  when  consensus  is  the  decision -making  procedure,  the  EU  can  only 
formulate and implement a foreign policy if there is agreement among all Member States, w hich 
has resulted in many instances of EU inaction on the ground and only vague political statements 
with which it is nearly impossible not to agree, particularly on some of the most controversial 
topics. 
All the actors involved in the formulation of EU fo reign policy and its execution 
through  diplomatic  activities,  both  EU  institutions  and  Member  States,  are  obliged  to 
cooperate, consult and coordinate their activities. Still, this has not been enough to avoid that, 
taken as a whole, EU diplomacy has been  characterised by both horizontal and vertical 
incoherence with the effect of generating internal power struggles and confusion on the part 
of third states. According to the Commission, this organization of EU diplomacy has meant a 
significant loss of visibility of EU action as well as of direct political influence,
6 and good 
personal relations between the High Representative (representing the Council in matters of the 
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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Relex Commissioner (representing the 
Commission and the foreign policy areas of its competence) have been central in avoiding 
even greater problems of incoherence.
7  
Apart from these general problems of political coherence, the sui generis construction 
of the EU as an international actor has also had a negative impact through the representation 
of the EU in third states and in international organizations. The rotating Presidency of the 
Council meant that every six months, a different EU Member State would represent the EU in 
the exterior in areas of the CFSP, whereas the Commission Delegation would represent the 
EU in other areas, a problem identified both the EU and third states.
8 This has given rise to 
several problems, the first of which being the lack of clarity on which person legitimately 
represents the EU in a third state: The Commission or the Presidency? Of course, a third state 
cannot  be  expected  to  understand  the  intricacies  of  the  international  distribution  of 
competences between EU institutions and Member States. Another problem was ca used by 
the rotating nature of the Presidency of the Council. In this case, the EU was represented by a 
new Member State every six months, with the negative effect that this has on political 
continuity and the creation of personal relationship with officia ls of the host state. A partial 
solution to the problem of continuity was found with the troika formula of the previous, 
present and future presidencies. Nevertheless, this did not solve the related problem of the EU 
position being represented sometimes by Member States with very little political weight. An 
important aspect of diplomatic communication has to do with the rank of the representative 
sent, and for some third states it was perceived as a lack of interest or a negative message that 
the EU would send small Member States to represent the Union, as occurred during crisis in 
Yugoslavia in 1991, where the EU presidency troika was constituted by the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg and Portugal.
9 This is probably one of the clearest example of where EU external 
action suffered not by a lack of political agreement and complex internal organization, but 
because of its diplomacy. The deception and anger cause by the diplomatic mission of the EU 
was not caused by the content of its proposals, but by the perceived lack of respect shown by 
the EU by sending persons considered to be low level and without political weight. To offset 
the negative effects of the rotating Presidency, the post of High Representative was created 
and  occupied by  former Spanish  Foreign  Minister a nd  NATO Secretary-General  Javier 
Solana. This only solved the problem partially, since in many cases, representatives of third 
states  would  still  prefer to  speak  directly  to  the ambassadors of the  United Kingdom, 
Germany or France. The reality remains that  any EU representative can only represent a 
common EU position when this exists, and that while it is being negotiated, or if the Member 
States can only agree vague political statements, the relevant interlocutors for third states will 
continue to be the representatives of the EU Member States with the political determination 
and economic, military and diplomatic capabilities to act decisively and forcefully. If the new 
EEAS and the increased powers of High Representative Catherine Ashton will ultimately 
solve the problem thus also comes back to the ability to create a real policy behind the 
diplomatic activities, if not the High Representative will continue to fall victim to the lack of 
convergence of EU Member State interests. 
To sum up, due to the nature  of the EU as  a non -state actor and its complex 
organization in a network of actors characterised by diffuse structures of authority and a lack 
of clarity, EU diplomacy has been characterised by a number of problems, to which only 
partial solutions had been created. So with respect to the diplomatic representation of the EU, 
an ever stronger perception gradually arose among academic analysts and EU officials that the 
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system had functioned poorly for years and that to continue along the same path was ever less 
feasible.
10  The  phrase  that  come  to  dominate  the  discourses  of  the  Council  and  the 
Commission
11 was the “need to speak with a one voice” in the world, a concern that has also 
been reflected in the academic doctrine. The confusion of third states due to the multiple 
representation
12  seemed  to  suggest  that  the  requirements  to  coordinate  and  cooperate 
established in the Treaties was no enough to ensure coherence and that it was necessary to 
reduce the complexity in terms of the number of different actors involved in EU diplomacy.  
Furthermore,  due  to  more  general  processes  of  economic,  political  and  social 
globalisation, ever more issue areas are the topic of diplomatic interchange and these are ever 
more interlinked, a fact which in itself had made the complex  network organization of EU 
diplomacy less adequate and thus created an isomorphic pressure upon the EU to adapt more 
conventional forms of diplomatic representation in an international system that, although 
undergoing transformation, at its core remains ba sed on the Westphalian state as a form of 
political organization. Also, the internal development of the EU as a polity has constituted a 
source  of  the  isomorphic  pressure  to  create  a  diplomacy  that  resembles  the  classical 
Westphalian state diplomacy to a greater extent. The EU has competences in ever more issue 
areas, and decisions are increasingly made by intervention of the European Parliament and 
majority voting in the Council. With more competences and more decision-making capacity, a 
more efficient form of diplomatic representation also seemed in order. These isomorphic 
pressures can also be conceptualised in terms of a gap between the expectations placed upon 
EU external action and its ability to deliver results, a phenomenon that is widespread among 
EU officials, third states and academic analysts.
13  
In the rest of the paper, I shall examine the answer of the EU to these perceived 
problems  and  weaknesses,  i.e.  the  institutional  innovation  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty  and, 
particularly, the creation of the EEAS. 
3. Institutional innovation: The reorganisation in Brussels 
The Lisbon Treaty affirms that the EU is a political entity with legal personality.
14 This 
reduces considerably the legal complexity of entering into international agreements. The 
Treaty explicitly states that the international agreements to which the EU is party creates 
obligations for both the EU institutions and its Member States.
15 Whereas such a unilateral 
declaration does not itself change the nature of the agreements that the EU has with thi rd 
states and international organizations, the disappearance of the European Communities as a 
legal subject differentiated from the EU and its Member States undoubtedly also increases the 
political visibility of the EU. In effect, the EU can now enter into  international agreements 
spanning all the issue areas of the former three pillars, and the previously used formula of 
signing  international  agreements  as  “The  European  Communities  and  its  Member  States” 
could be scrapped. The practical implications of the changes should not be overestimated, 
since the principal limitation on the EU’s ability to conclude international agreements, before 
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Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 213. 
11 C. Portela, "El Servicio Europeo de Acci￳n Exterior: un instrumento para reforzar la política exterior", in A. Sorroza 
Blanco (ed.), Presidencia Espa￱ola: retos en una nueva Europa, Madrid, Elcano, 2010, p. 122. 
12 S. Duke, "Providing for European-level diplomacy…”, op. cit., p. 212. 
13 B. Becerril, "Un paso m￡s hacia una diplomacia común europea", in A. Sorroza Blanco (ed.), Presidencia Espa￱ola…, op. 
cit,  p. 149. The concept of a gap between the capabilities and expectation was introduced by Christopher Hill, see C. Hill, 
"Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?", in J. Peterson y H. Sjursen (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: 
Competing Visions of the CFSP, London, Routledge, 1998; C. Hill, "The Capabilities-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising 
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and after the Lisbon Treaty, derives from the need for internal political agreement among EU 
institutions, including approval by the European Parliament, and consensus among Member 
States, depending on the nature of the agreement and the political issue area.
16  Still, the 
subject status of the EU in the international system is consolidated and on the symbolic level 
further contributes to strengthening the identity of the EU as an influential international actor. 
The fact that the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) continues to exist as a 
separate legal subject means that also with the Lisbon Treaty the EU has two disti nct 
international legal personalities, which reduces clarity as for the precise definition of the EU 
as an international actor. Nevertheless, due to the low visibility and level of international 
activity of Euratom, the conclusion remains that the Lisbon Treaty significantly simplifies the 
existence of the EU as an actor in the international system from a formal point of view, with 
the practical political implications being more difficult to estimate. 
Another important aspect of the EU’s legal personality is the transformation of the 
Delegations of the Commission in the exterior into European Union Delegations, representing 
the  EU  across  all  policy  areas,  with  a  European  External  Action  Service  being  not  only 
responsibly for the representation of the EU through the Delegations, but also the hub of EU 
foreign policy decision-making in Brussels. Rather than the change in the legal status of the 
Union,  the  impact  of  this  institutional  revolution  will  probably  be  much  greater,  since  it 
streamlines  not  only  the  diplomatic  representation  of  the  Union,  but  also  creates  new 
structures  of  interaction  between  diplomats  and  policy-makers  that  allows  for  the 
intensification of socialization processes to occur, thereby helping the gradual emergence of 
greater convergence among EU officials and Member State diplomats and policy-makers with 
respect not only to the specific political content of EU diplomacy in narrowly defined issue 
areas, but also more generally with respect to the identity of the EU and the causal ideas upon 
which its international agency is based. The rest of the paper will therefore focus on the 
organizational changes and their impact on EU diplomacy more generally, rather than the 
legal issues. 
An  important  motivation  behind  the  Lisbon  Treaty  was  to  offset  the  problems  of 
horizontal  and  vertical  coherence  in  EU  diplomacy  and  thereby  strengthen  the  EU  as  an 
international  actor.  In  this  vein,  the  Treaty  sought  to  eliminate  the  pillar  structure,  an 
important source of the EU’s coherence problems, but although the pillars formally disappear, 
the exercise was not entirely successful.
17 The Lisbon Treaty creates a single institutional 
framework for EU external action, with important consequences for its diplomacy, but with 
respect to the decision making in the CFSP   area, the former second pillar of the Union 
remains differentiated from the rest. It also modifies the general equilibrium between the EU 
institutions,  generally  expanding  the  influence  of  the  European  Parliament  through  the 
extension of the decision-making procedure formerly know as co -decision, which has now 
been renamed the ordinary procedure, where it is equal to the Council when approving the 
proposals of the Commission.
18 Another important factor representing another advancement 
in the integration process is the extension of Council majority voting to more issue areas, 
fundamentally  leaving  consensus -based  decision  making  to  foreign  and  security  policy. 
Whereas these general changes should not be disregarded, a principal conclusion is that the 
bifurcation of EU external action continues to exist as for the decision making, although it has 
been substantially modified with respect to the diplomatic representation of the EU in the 
exterior, as will be analysed in section 4 of this paper.  
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challenges ahead?, Challenge Research Papers, no. 10, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008, pp. 2-3 y p. 10. 
18 C. Guti￩rrez Espada and M. J. Cervell Hortal, "El Tratado de Lisboa y las instituciones (no jurisdiccionales) de la Uni￳n", 
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Interestingly,  the  Lisbon  Treaty  contains  only  a  few  general  notions  on  the 
organization and functioning of its main institutional innovation, namely the creation of the 
European External Action Service as an autonomous body of the EU, leaving the details to be 
worked out in later negotiations and decisions by the European Council. In the following sub-
sections, the focus will be on the changes in the individual EU institutions that are most 
relevant for assessing the changes in EU diplomacy. 
3.1 The European Council 
The Lisbon Treaty contains a number of innovations with respect to the European 
Council.  It  is  formally  made  an  Institution  of  the  EU,  but  more  importantly,  the  High 
Representative participates in its meetings. This creates a direct link between the institution 
where the Member States are represented at the highest level with the head of the EEAS. As 
such, the strategic direction that the European Council is to provide counts with the input both 
of the High Representative and the President of the European Commission, although neither 
votes, and there is an opportunity for a formal exchange of ideas between Member States and 
the EU representative. More importantly for EU diplomacy, the Lisbon Treaty creates the post 
of a permanent President of the European Council, with a mandate of two and a half years and 
occupied by Herman van Rompuy. Although an important effect of the permanent President is 
undoubtedly  internal  with  respect  to  the  management  of  the  functioning  of  the  European 
Council,
19 there is also an impact on EU diplomacy.  
With a permanent President setting the agenda and drafting policy statements, the 
European Council is less likely to be biased towards the foreign policy interests of the 
Member State holding the rotating presidency, and as such the institutional innovation should 
provide greater continuity. This effect is of course relative, since the European Council makes 
decisions by consensus. 
Of more importance is probably the visibility effect of having a permanent President, 
even if van Rompuy has been frequently criticised for his lack of charisma. Nevertheless, the 
EU now has a continuous representation of the CFSP policy area at the highest political level 
in the form of the President of the European Council. Here, the Lisbon Treaty falls short of  
establishing a precise division of labour between the President of the European Council and 
the High Representative, since both of them has functions of representing the Union in the 
CFSP policy area.
20 This creates ample scope for conflict and differences of opinion and 
diplomatic style,
21 which makes good personal relations vital for a smooth functioning of EU 
diplomatic representation at the highest level.  
In practice, van Rompuy seems to have centred his activity on representing the Union 
at the highest  level of Heads of State or Government in bilateral relations, as well as 
participation in multilateral summits in the same function. This indicates an informal division 
of labour also identified by Duke,
22 where the President of the European Council does n ot 
enter into the detailed foreign policy content or specific negotiations with third states, but 
leaves this to the High Representative and her EEAS. The parallel to the division of labour 
between a Head of State or Government and the foreign minister of  any given state is rather 
straightforward, which makes the division of labour beneficial not only for the coherence of 
EU diplomacy, but also for reducing confusion on the part of third states, in the sense that the 
EU diplomatic set-up in this case resembles a well-know model. This of course depends on 
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21 B. Crowe, The European External Action Service. Roadmap for success, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs 
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whether  the  relatively  smooth  functioning  of  this  division  of  labour  is  the  result  of  the 
personal relationship between van Rompuy and Ashton, or whether they by their activities 
have created precedents and customs that their successors will also follow. 
3.2. The Council of the European Union 
With  respect  to  the  organization  of  the  Council,  the  General  Affairs  Council  is 
separated from the Foreign Affairs Council. The General Affairs Council is responsible for 
coordinating the work of the other Council formations and preparing the meetings of the 
European Council, thus making it a kind of Super-council.
 23 In this respect, the Council must 
cooperate with the President of the European Council as well as the Commission, but since it 
continues  to  be  presided  by  a  new  Member  State  every  six  months  as  the  rest  of  the 
formations of the Council (with the exception of the Foreign Affairs Council),
 24 there are also 
obstacles to continuity and coordination present in the construction.  
The Foreign Affairs Council is presided by the High Representative, which provides 
for  greater  continuity  and  coherence,  and  by  means  of  the  agenda-setting  power  of  a 
presidency changes the equilibrium between Member States and Union. Of course, that fact of 
having the Foreign Affairs Council segregated from the General Affairs Council and brought 
under the leadership of the High Representative does not prevent the Member States from 
discussing issues with foreign policy implications in the General Affairs Council, this way 
keeping the High Representative and the EEAS out of the loop. Still, for EU diplomacy, the 
fact of now having both the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU 
presided by permanent presidencies held by EU officials is of paramount importance. By 
reducing the number of representatives involved in EU diplomacy, for third states it is now 
much easier to put a face on the EU, and due to the division of labour between the van 
Rompuy and Ashton, the role of each representative is also relatively clear. A remaining 
complicating factor is the representative role of the President of the European Commission, 
which  considerably  muddies  the  picture.  In  the  last  sub-section,  the  role  of  the  High 
Representative will be expressly analysed, but first attention turns to the division of labour 
among the different institutional bureaucracies in Brussels, the role of the new EEAS and its 
relationship with the Commission. 
3.3. The creation of the European External Action Service 
The  Lisbon  Treaty  establishes  the  European  External  Action  Service  as  the  main 
institutional  innovation,  although  apart  from  its  role  as  an  organ  to  service  the  High 
Representative, the Treaty text does not provide any specific indications of its functioning or 
objectives.
25 The internal organization and precise role was left to a future Council decision 
that came about in July 2010
26 on the bases of a proposal made by the High Representative 
the previous March.
27 
In general, and contrary to what could be deduced from the impasse in the process of 
European integration after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, the Decision of the Council 
establishes  a  configuration  that  is  close  to  what  has  been  denominated  by  Duke  the 
“maximalist” version of the EEAS, among the variety of proposals for its competences and 
                                                 
23 C. Guti￩rrez Espada and M. J. Cervell Hortal, La adaptaci￳n al tratado de Lisboa (2007) del sistema institucional decisorio 
de la Uni￳n, su acci￳n exterior y personalidad jurídica, Granada, Comares, 2010, p. 22. 
24 TUE (Lisbon), art. 16. 
25 TUE (Lisbon), art. 27. 
26 Council of the European Union, Council decision establishing the or ganisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service, 2010, 11665/1/10 REV 1. 
27 C. Ashton, Proposal for a Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
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size in the previous debate.
28 Even so, according to the Decision, and contrary to the wishes 
of the European Parliament,
29 the EEAS is established as an autonomous organ of the EU
30 
and not incorporated into the Commission, a model that was initially defended by both the 
Parliament and the Commission itself,
31 and which would seem to make the most sense, if 
analysed from a strictly functional point of view, where the Commission exercises the 
executive function in the European polity. This would have been the EU equivalent of 
establishing a Foreign Ministry within the Federal government.  Due to Member State 
reluctance, the compromise was that of a large EEAS with extensive competences, but 
separated from the Commission, so as to reflect the double role of the EEAS as the diplomatic 
representation of the CFSP as well as the policy areas under the Commissions authority.  
The EEAS consists of two main functional areas, the Delegations to third states and 
international organizations, analysed in the following section 4 of this paper, and a central 
administration in Brussels. This way, it is important to note that the EEAS is not only an 
organization for the diplomatic representation of the EU, but also a forum for  the analysis, 
planning and formulation of EU foreign policy, drafting Council Conclusions, policy papers 
and negotiating mandates to be decided upon.
32 As for the diplomatic representation of the 
EU, the EEAS is thus central to the EU’s efforts to increase its coherence on the international 
scene, since one single organization represents the EU’s point of view across all policy areas, 
with the usual exception being areas without political agreement among Member States, in 
which case the EU will not have a common position, but 28 different opinions represented by 
28 diplomatic services.  
Also, the Lisbon Treaty formulates the values and objectives of EU foreign policy 
generally and without prejudice to specific policy areas,
33 which should in help the coherence 
of EU diplomacy, at least in principle, and the legal basis becomes clearer. Nevertheless, this 
increased coherence is of course with respects to goals that are compatible, in the sense that 
the same EU policies towards a specific third state will further  them all, some which cannot 
be  simply  assumed  is  the  case,  e.g.  with  respect  to  the  liberalisation  of  world  trade, 
eradication  of  poverty  in  the  world  and  the  sustainable  development  of  developing 
countries.
34 
With the creation of the EEAS we therefore hav e a good structure for reducing the 
problems of horizontal coherence in EU diplomacy that stem from the multitude of actors 
previously involved in representing the EU. The Lisbon Treaty does not change the nature of 
EU diplomacy as coexisting with Member S tate diplomacy, so the problem of vertical 
coherence does not change directly as a function of the institutional innovation, although a 
denser  institutional  environment  with  the  EEAS  will  probably  enhance  the  ‘coordination 
reflex’ of the Member States broadly speaking, in the sense that the EU dimension of Member 
State foreign policy is present at all stages of the policy process and coordination in the EU 
framework is not simply an option at the last phase of implementing the specific foreign 
                                                 
28 S. Duke, "Providing for European-level diplomacy after Lisbon…”, op. cit., pp. 218-221; S. Duke, "The Lisbon Treaty and 
external relations", Eipascope, vol. 2008, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15-16. 
29 On the EU European Parliament, see S. Medel G￡lvez, “La posici￳n del Parlamento Europeo en torno a la diplomacia 
común, con especial referencia al Informe Brok,” in J. M. Sobrino Heredia (dir.), Innovaci￳n y conocimiento. IV Jornadas 
Iberoamericanas de Estudios Internacionales, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2010; R. J￡uregui Atondo, El Parlamento Europeo: un 
actor decisivo en las negociaciones sobre la creaci￳n del Servicio Europeo de Acci￳n Exterior ARI, no, 147, Madrid, Real 
Instituto Elcano, 2010.  
30 Council decision…, op. cit., art. 1. 
31 S. Duke, "Providing for European-level diplomacy after Lisbon…”, op. cit., p. 217. 
32  EEAS,  ”EEAS  Review”,  2013,  unnumbered  document,  available  at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf, p. 9 
33 TEU (Lisbon), art. 21. 
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policy initiative. This socialization effect on Member State diplomatic practice should prove a 
fruitful path for further studies. 
3.4. Diplomatic competences and the division of labour in Brussels 
The EEAS is not simply the Foreign Ministry of the EU, nor its diplomatic service. It 
is  sui  generis  and  can  be  characterised  as  an  interstitial  organization,  emerging  in  the 
interstices between different organizational field and draws upon the legitimacy, physical, 
informational, financial and legal resources of these other fields, here Member States and EU 
institutions and bureaucratic structures.
35 
The main tasks of the EEAS is to function as support to the High Representative in her 
mandate to implement the CFSP, preside the Foreign Affairs Council and coordinate and 
implement the external relations of the Commission, in her capacity of Vice -president of the 
Commission. In this sense, the EEAS is primarily the secretariat of the High Representative, 
although it also assists the President of the Commission and the President o f the European 
Council in their function as representatives of the EU.
36 This way, the secretariat function of 
the EEAS transcends the division of representative competences among the three mains 
persons, which should provide greater continuity and coherence to the representation. 
With respect to policy making, the EEAS has taken over from the Council Secretariat 
the tasks of preparing the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council presided by the High 
Representative, as well as preparing the activities and pre siding the meetings of the foreign 
affairs-relevant  working  groups  and  committees,  including  the  Political  and  Security 
Committee (PSC), central to EU policy-making in the CFSP area.
37 
The central administration of the EEAS is headed by what the press has d ubbed a 
‘French  spider’,  in  reference  to  the  fact  that  the  administrative  structure  of  the  EEAS  is 
largely modelled on the French administration of its diplomacy. In fact, the Corporate Board 
of  the  EEAS  consists  of  a  powerful  Executive  Secretary  General  and  a  Chief  Operating 
Officer, who in turn have two deputies to help coordinate the Directorate Generals, the EU 
delegations and represent the EEAS.
38 Below this administrative level, the EEAS is organised 
into a number of Managing Directorates, which contain both geographically defined desks, as 
well as multilateral and thematic units. Each of the Directorates must coordinate its activities 
with the “relevant services” of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Apart from these 
structures,  specialised  departments  are  responsible  for  human  resources,  finance,  legal 
counselling and parliamentary affairs. Interestingly, a service as vital as public diplomacy was 
maintained within the Commission, although it reports directly to the HR/VP.
39  
Although the EEAS is a new organ of the European Union, it is based on the transfer 
of functions and staff from the Commission and the Council Secretariat that took place for the 
launch of the EEAS in January 2011. From the Council Secretariat the units transferred were 
basically those working in the area of the CFSP in the DG External and Politico -Military 
Affairs,  but  also  including  the intelligence  centre  and  the EU military  staff. From the 
Commission was transferred the DG Relex, entrusted with the external relations of  the 
Commission, both the Brussels staff and that of the Delegations, together constituting two 
thirds of the staff initially transferred. Also, part of the DG Development was transferred, so 
that the EEAS has geographical desks covering the whole globe, wh ereas the rest of the DG 
                                                 
35  J.  Batora,  ”The  ‘Mitrailleuse  Effect’:  The  EEAS  as  an  Interstitial  Organization  and  the  Dynamics  of  Innovation  in 
Diplomacy”,in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 51, no. 4, 2013, pp. 598-613, p. 601. 
36 Council decision…, op. cit., art. 2. In fact, in 2012, the briefings for the HR/VP constituted less than a third of the total 
amount elaborated by the EEAS. EEAS, “EEAS Review”, op. cit., p. 8 
37 Council Decision, art. 4. 
38 EEAS, “EEAS Review”, op. cit., p. 6 
39 The organization chart of the EEAS is available at: 
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was fused with the DG AIDCO. Although the Commission thus continues to work within the 
area  of  development  cooperation,  the  EEAS  “contributes”  to  the  programming  and 
management  of  the  instruments  with  which  development  policy  is  executed,  such  as  the 
European  Development  Fund  and  the  European  Instrument  for  Democracy  and  Human 
Rights.  With  the  EEAS  being  “responsible  for  preparing  (...)  the  decisions  of  the 
Commission”  in  this  respect,  this  means  basically  that  the  EEAS  is  involved  with  the 
multiannual programming and geographically determined work of the new DG DEVCO in the 
form of elaboration of national and regional strategies. Thus, the EEAS implies an important 
reorganization of the EU with respect to its international activities directed at developing 
countries. 
In  its  strive  for  increased  horizontal  coherence,  the  EU  has  thus  effectively  fused 
development cooperation with the CFSP. This has of course been criticised by numerous 
NGO’s that fear that the assistance of the EU to developing countries would be increasingly 
subordinated to the geopolitical concerns of the CFSP, instead of being based on politically 
neutral criteria aiming to help societies develop and alleviate human suffering. But the inverse 
could also be argued with CFSP initiatives being obliged to pursue the article 21 objectives of 
poverty  reduction  and  sustainable  development.  Whatever  is  the  case,  coherence  means 
thinking development and geopolitics together, and in my opinion the discussion should be 
understood in the general evolution of the EU towards more a more assertive international 
strategy based on the defence of interests and the lesser priority given to previously primary 
objectives of democracy promotion, dissemination of human rights values and exporting the 
EU model of peaceful coexistence among states.
40 
With respect to areas of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement, these 
are also divided between the Commission and the EEAS, although of course under the 
supervision  of  the  High  Represent ative.
41  The  enlargement  Commissioner  still  has 
international projection, although with the new structures of coordination, clearly subordinate 
to the High Representative. Also other Directorate Generals of the European Commission 
inevitably has an internat ional dimension in their work, most notable DG Trade and DG 
Humanitarian  Aid  and  Civil  Protection  but  also  Energy  and  Climate  Change,  which 
nevertheless are not mentioned in the Council Decision.
42 Here it should be noted that this 
complexity is by no means unique for the EU. The EEAS identifies the close cooperation with 
the Commission as vital,
43  but it should also be noted that this problem of coordination 
repeats itself also with respect to any Foreign Ministry, whose role is changing from that of a 
gatekeeper to a boundary spanner,
44 in the sense that in a globalised world, most sectoral 
ministries will have an international dimension in their work that should be coordinated 
through the Foreign Ministry. The EU is in this sense mimicking the state, aboveme ntioned 
institutional differences aside, with respect to the organization of its diplomacy, since the 
states are also moving away from a centralised model to one based on the horizontal and 
                                                 
40 In this sense, studies indicate that the EU prioritises political stability over democracy and human rights for geopolitical 
reasons, imposing few, if any sanctions in the framework of the conditionality included in the EU’s international agreements 
with  third  states.  See  R.  Youngs,  The  end  of  democratic  conditionality:  good  riddance?,  Madrid,  Fundaci￳n  para  las 
Relaciones Internacionales y el Di￡logo Exterior (FRIDE), 2010. Also, sanctions imposed generally reflect the relationship of 
the EU with the state and the interests of that specific Member States may have, see C. Portela, European Union sanctions 
and foreign policy, London, Routledge, 2010, p. 163. 
41 Council decision…, op. cit., art. 9. 
42 For details of the relationship of the EEAS with each Commission DG, see N. Helwig, P. Ivan and H. Kostanyan, The new 
EU foreign policy architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
2013, pp. 38-49. 
43 EEAS, “EEAS Review”, op. cit., pp. 6-9 
44  B. Hocking, "Introduction: gatekeepers and boundary -spanners  -  Thinking about foreign ministries in the European  
Union", in B. Hocking y D. Spence (eds.),  Foreign ministries in the European Union: Integrating diplomats, Basingstoke, 
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vertical coordination of the external activities of the different branches of the central, regional 
and local administrations of the state. 
With respect to the vertical coherence and coordination, the Lisbon Treaty imposes 
clear obligations on the diplomatic services of the Member States to coordinate and cooperate 
with the EEAS, although it falls short of establishing procedures for how to implement this 
cooperation, not even clarifying if it refers to the central administration of the EEAS, where 
the Member States are directly involved in the CFSP structures through their representatives 
in key fora such as the Political and Security Committee, or whether it refers to cooperation 
by the diplomatic missions on the ground in third states and international organizations.
45 
Still, the Council Decision reiterates the obligatio n of consulting and cooperating of EEAS, 
the Commission the Council Secretariat and the diplomatic services of the Member States,
46 
so that in practice there is little doubt that the intention not is to establish a strict division of 
labour among the different actors, but rather seeking a maximum coordination in the network 
of actors involved in EU diplomacy. In the absence of established procedures, the vertical 
coherence of EU diplomacy ultimately falls back on the political will of the Member States to 
coordinate  their  foreign  policies  generally,  and  on  the  enthusiasm  of  the  individual 
ambassadors in a given third state.  
With respect to the horizontal coordination, the Commission previously coordinated 
the interaction of the DGs of the RELEX family (those   with external activities) through 
frequent meetings in specialised coordination committee. The Lisbon Treaty builds on this 
method for horizontal coordination but substantially changes it, since it creates a hierarchy 
within the college of Commissioners, giving the Vice-president (and High Representative) the 
authority to coordinate the activities of the other Commissioners. The Vice -president is thus 
responsible for the overall coordination of the external activities, not only of the Commission, 
but by virtue of her competences as High Representative, of the entire European Union. This 
greatly improves the formal basis for coordinating EU foreign policy across policy areas.  
With respect to the Brussels-based diplomatic activities, in contrast, the picture is less 
clear-cut. The President of the European Commission remains the maximum representative of 
the Commission, also in the exterior. So apart from the relatively simple division of labour 
between the President of the European Council and the HR/VP in t erms of diplomatic 
representation, the presence of the Commission President complicates the picture, since his 
role is much less clear with respect to the President of the European Council and the HR/VP. 
The delimitation of the representative function of t he President and Vice-president of the 
Commission is not clear, and the scene is thus set for potential conflict between the two,
47 and 
may create confusion unnecessary confusion in third states as to the roles and competences of 
each EU representative. In this regard, it is questionable if the current diplomatic troika of the 
President  of  the  European  Council,  the  President  of  the  Commission  and  the  HR/VP 
significantly reduces the complexity and possible confusion in the diplomatic representation 
of the EU when compared to the previous troika of the rotating Presidency, the Commission 
President and the High Representative. Although the creation of the EEAS undoubtedly 
dramatically increases the scope for political coordination, the actual reduction of complexity 
in its diplomatic representation is not to be found so much in the high -level representation of 
the EU by its top political personalities in Brussels, but in the diplomatic missions of the 
EEAS, topic of the next section of the paper. 
Also, even if the new structures significantly increase the scope for a more efficient 
horizontal coordination, there are also elements that seem to suggest certain continuity with 
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46 Council decision…, op. cit., art. 3. 
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respect to possible competitive dynamics among the actors involved in EU diplomacy. Some 
analysts stress that uniting the staff of different units of the Commission, the Council and 
diplomats delegated from Member States diplomatic services in the same EEAS bureaucracy 
does not necessarily mean that the political infighting and competition among these factions 
should  not  continue  within  the  new  structures  of  the  EEAS.
48  This  will  depend  on  the 
leadership abilities of the HR/VP and the general support that the new structures will have 
among Member States. In any case, it is also likely that a corporate identity will emerge 
within the EEAS, with the staff and units gradually losing their previous identity linked to 
their institutional origin.  
This corporate identity and general support of the Member State will depend on the 
ability  of  the  EEAS  to  gain  legitimacy  and  credibility  as  an  institution,
49  which in turns 
depends on the EEAS’s ability to carry out its mandate and manage the EUs international 
relations. It should be noted that the Member States have with the Lisbon Treaty and the 
creation of the EEAS not renounced any competence in foreign policy and diplomacy. The 
long-term  scope  for  the  EEAS  to  represent  the  EU  in  its  entirety  of  course  depends  on 
whether the Member States will increasingly let  themselves be represented by the EEAS 
instead of their national diplomatic services, which again boils down to the main source of 
incoherence in EU foreign policy and diplomacy: the degree of convergence among Member 
States’ interests and foreign policy goals. 
3.5 The centre of coordination of EU diplomacy: The HR/VP 
The Lisbon treaty centres the coordination of EU external action in the post of High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-president of the 
European  Commission  (HR/VP),  occupied  by  Catherine  Ashton.  Thereby,  three  previous 
posts are merged into one: The President of the Foreign Affairs Council (rotating every six 
months), the High Representative of the CFSP (occupied by Javier Solana since its creation) 
and the European Commissioner responsible for External Relations. This construction was 
initially opposed by Javier Solana
50 as well as Member States such as the United Kingdom, 
Sweden and Belgium,
51 and obviously falls short of the ideal option (for the purposes of 
coordination) of simply integrating foreign  policy issue areas into the first -pillar working 
method of the Union (the ordinary decision -making procedure) and making the EEAS a 
Directorate General of the European Commission. Still, it is a notable advance with respect to 
coordination between the CFSP and other foreign policy issue areas, since the same person 
now heads all the relevant bureaucratic structures. One of the specific objectives of the Lisbon 
Treaty was to generate more coherence and continuity in the foreign policy and diplomatic 
representation of the EU, and largely accomplishes this by making the HR/VP responsible for 
the totality of EU foreign policy and diplomacy. Of particular relevance is here the leadership 
and political direction that the HR/VP can give to EU diplomacy, now that s he has can 
present global initiatives and policy proposals by having this privilege both in the Council, as 
for the CFSP, and in the Commission, as for other policy areas. This way, the HR/VP 
coordinates not only the initiatives of the various DGs of the C ommission with external 
implications to their work, but also relations with the Council, the Commission and the 
Parliament,  with  central  focus  on  coordination  with  the  Commission  DG’s  with  external 
implications in their work.
52  
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In sum, the scope for horizontal coherence of the EU foreign policy that its diplomatic 
structures  execute  is  thus  greatly  increased  with  the  institutional  innovation  that  the  new 
HR/VP  represents.  Furthermore,  this  innovation  also  has  a  more  direct  impact  on  the 
diplomatic representation of the Union. The HR/VP heads the EEAS,
53 including both its 
central administration and policy -formulating bureaucracy in Brussels and the diplomatic 
corps  of  the  EU,  centred  on  the  Union  Delegations  in  third  states  and  international 
organizations that are responsible for EU representation abroad across policy areas.
54 This 
unified representation of the EU
55, described in the following section in more detail, has 
arguably contributed to EU visibility, as has the fact of having a single HR/VP representing  
the Union continuously and across policy areas. 
4.  Diplomatic  practices:  European  Union  representation  in  third  states  and 
international organizations  
4.1 EU diplomatic representation in third states 
EU diplomacy is executed by a network of actors, where overall efficiency and impact 
depends to a large degree on coordination and cooperation. The inevitable context of the 
diplomatic practices of the EEAS is therefore that they coexist with those of each EU Member 
States that continue engaging in diplomatic relationships alongside the EEAS as independent 
sovereign  states,  although  the  positions  they  defend  are  in  many  cases  the  result  of 
discussions in Brussels,
56 and when no political agreement was possible, substitute a common 
EU position.  
The Lisbon Treaty and Council Decision on the establishment of the EEAS do not 
contain provisions with a direct impact on Member State diplomacy.  Rather, the Treaty 
clearly specifies
57 that the EEAS dos not affect the responsibility of each sovereign Member 
State to formulate and execute its foreign policy, nor its diplomatic representation in third 
states and international organizations. There is no intention to substitute Member State 
diplomacy, and the EEAS should therefore be understood not as a change of the networked  
nature of EU diplomacy, executed by Member States and EEAS, but a change within the 
network  that  allow  its  it  to  coordinate  more  efficiently  and  achieve  a  more  unified 
representation in its diplomatic relationships. 
Although in a given third state, EU diplomacy thus consists of the activities of both the 
EEAS and the Member States that cooperate and coordinate, the institutional centrepiece is 
clearly the European Union Delegations. The previous Commission Delegations represented 
only the European Commission, whereas the Lisbon Treaty explicitly establishes that the new 
EU delegations represent the entire EU.
58  
The functions of the Delegations have thereby change in two ways: Firstly, they are 
now under the authority of the HR/VP, with the Head of Mission b eing from the EEAS. 
Although Commission staff continues to work in the Delegations, they are nevertheless 
placed within the EEAS structure and as such institutionally separated from the Commission. 
Secondly, the competences of the EEAS in CFSP matters mean  that the EU Delegations 
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assumes the functions that were previously exercised by the embassy of the Member State 
holding the Presidency of the Council. There is no longer a special role for the diplomatic 
mission of the Presidency, which comes to have a role in the EU network similar to that of 
other Member State representations. The Delegations now represent the EU across all policy 
areas and come to functionally resemble the classical Westphalian state embassies, although 
of course with respect to content they continue to be subject to the constraint of political 
consensus among Member States. The innovations thus greatly reduce previously existing 
problems of continuity and complexity.  
The problem of continuity in EU diplomacy was largely a function of the construction 
of  being  represented  in  CFSP  areas  by  the  rotating  Presidency.  This  meant  a  change  in 
political priorities every six months, which in itself is a complicating factor. But the task of 
diplomats to create stable relations with host state interlocutors was also problematic, since 
the task fell to new persons every six months. To third states, diplomatic complexity is also 
reduces, since each state diplomat now represent only the accrediting state and not in some 
cases also the EU. This makes things simpler, and host state representatives tasked with EU 
relations do not have to deal with new people every six months. 
Complexity is also reduced with respect to policy areas. The host state now interacts 
with  the  EU  Delegation  irrespective  of  the  issue  area,  whereas  before  the  relevant  EU 
representative was either the working in the Commission Delegation or the in embassy of the 
Member State holding the Presidency. This is of course particularly relevant with issues that 
span the internal division of competences in previous pillar structure of the EU, where the EU 
can now speak with one voice.  
But the creation of the EEAS has not only reduced complexity in the EU interaction 
with the host states, but also had different implications for the internal cooperative dynamics 
in the EU network of actors executing its diplomacy. First of all, the Delegations needed more 
human resources to deal with new policy areas, which also made obvious that new physical 
facilities  would  be  necessary  in  some  cases.
59  Secondly, the Delegation has assumed the 
function of coordinating the activities of all the EU actors with diplomatic missions to a third 
state (EU and Member States) and it now presides over the coordination meetings, instead of 
this task being performed by the rotating Presidency. This strengthens the role of the EU Head 
of Mission within the EU network, but also gives her a clearer profile in the negotiations with 
the host state, since she now coordinates the EU position communicated by all actors across 
policy areas, and not only in first pillar issue areas.
 60 
A  first  conclusion  to  be  drawn  with  respect  to  EU  representation  in  bilateral 
relationships is therefore that the EEAS greatly simplifies diplomatic interaction, increases the 
scope for vertical coherence, by moving the balance towards the EU Head of Mission, as well 
as horizontal coherence, since the EU Delegation now speaks for the Union in all policy 
areas. A second conclusion is that these diplomatic advantages have come at the price of a 
greater internal complexity within the EU Delegations, since the divide between supranational 
and intergovernmental policy areas has now simply been internalised within the EEAS in 
Brussels and in the Delegations.
61 
Whereas before the EU Delegations only worked for the Commission, they now work 
for different Brussels bureaucracies. First and foremost, they work for the EEAS, which has 
the coordination role also in Brussels, with the Head of Mission being in all cases an EEAS 
official. But as mentioned in the previous section, only the DG Relex of the Commission was 
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incorporated  into  the  new  EEAS  structure.  This  also  means  the  other  DGs  of  the  EU 
Commission  with  important  external  dimensions  to  their  work,  such  as  Enlargement, 
Development and Trade, continue to exist outside the structures of the EEAS. As such, the 
EU Delegations work with more issue areas than the central administration of the EEAS in 
Brussels, and therefore the Delegations have staff not only from the EEAS, but also from the 
relevant Commission DGs. This state of affairs is obviously the expression of the division of 
labour in Brussels, where the DGs of the Commission with external implications of their work 
continue to exist independently of the EEAS. In Brussels, the HR/VP spans the institutions 
and coordinates the policy content, whereas in the Delegations this task is performed by the 
Head of Mission, responsible for the totality of Delegation activities and the coordination and 
coherence of these.
62   
The issue of the staff of the Delegations was not cl arified by the Lisbon Treaty, but 
left the question to be decided by the posterior Council Decision.
63 The general formula is that 
the Delegation staff comes from the EEAS, and from specific Commission DGs when 
relevant. The staff of the specific EU Delegat ion thus largely depends on the third state in 
question, for instance there will be a predominance of Commission staff working with the 
implementation of specific projects when the host state is a developing country, whereas there 
will be more EEAS staff w hen the host state is one with which the EU maintains more 
‘political’ relations, such as Russia. 
A general problem with respect to the staff of the Delegations that has only been 
partially resolved with the creation of the EEAS is the fact that the persons are in most cases 
not career diplomats and that they therefore do not feel adequately prepared for representing 
the EU in diplomatic relationships.
64 Former Commission or Council officials need traditional 
diplomatic training and the Member State diplomat s that now form part of the EEAS need 
training in the intricacies of the functioning of the EU, particularly its external relations.  
Even without a diplomatic academy for the training of Member State diplomats as 
well as Commission and Council officials,  it is vital that training programmes facilitate the 
socialisation of the participants, so that the persons working both in the EEAS central 
administration and in the Delegations abroad come to share an EU identity and common EU 
outlook, with a primary professional loyalty towards the EEAS and a “European attitude.”
65 
This socialisation is already helped by the daily functioning of the EEAS, where staff with 
different  institutional  origins  work  side  by  side.
66  Evidence from EU voting in the UN 
General Assembly shows that over the decades, there is increasing political coherence among 
EU Member States,
67 a sign that socialisation and coordination dynamics are functioning. 
What  must  be  created  is  an  EU  level  epistemic  community  of  foreign  policy 
professionals that is compatible with, but distinct from, the epistemic communities existing in 
the foreign services of each EU Member State and the EU Commission.
68 This is an on-going 
process of socialisation, which will determine whether the EEAS becomes a battle ground and 
tool for other actors where each will struggle to impose its views on the EEAS in its totality or 
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whether it will evolve into an EU diplomatic service. An important factor is here that the 
Member  States  stop  sending  problematic  or  close-to-retirement-age  officials,  which  was 
previously the norm.
69 The outcome of this socialisation process will then again feedback into 
the  EU  identity  as  an  international  actor,
70  and  its  nature  as  a  political  entity  in  the 
international  system;  a  collection  of  sovereign  sta tes  that  cooperate  or  a  polity  and 
international actor that exists beyond state sovereignty and Westphalian diplomatic culture 
and structures. 
4.2 EU participation in international organizations 
Whereas the establishment of the EEAS do not cause great problems in the bilateral 
diplomatic relationships of the EU, but rather improves the coordination in the EU network, 
the situation is quite different with respect to the participation of the EU in international 
organizations.  Due  to  the  internal  distribution  of  competences,  it  was  previously  the 
Commission that generally represented the EU in first pillar issue areas; whereas the rotating 
Presidency of the Council represented the EU in CFSP matters. Therefore, in the many areas 
of mixed competences and pillar-crossing issue areas, the EU was represented jointly by the 
Commission and the Presidency. With the establishment of the EEAS, the representations 
accredited to international organizations are now EU representations, as are the two offices 
that the Council maintained in Geneva and New York.
71 
From the outset, it was not clear whether the Commission or the EEAS should 
represent the EU and its Member States in international organizations, and at which political 
level,
72 although according to the Lisbon Treaty,  the Union Delegations should perform the 
task of representing the EU,
73 made possible by the legal personality that the Treaty creates 
for the EU.
74 After a struggle over who could and should represent the EU and its Member 
States outside of the area of specific EU competences, that lead to a crisis in the autumn of 
2011  with  blocked  statements  and  demarches,
75  the  Council  adopted  a  set  of  General 
Arrangements for EU Statements in multilateral organisations.
76 This gives the right of the 
Member States to decide on a case-by-case basis whether and how to be jointly represented, 
by the rotating Presidency, EU Delegation, European Council President or the Commission. 
Once there is an agreement on who should represent the EU position, there is the question of 
who is being represented. In this sense, there exist three different kinds of statements of the 
EU network in international organisations, according to the division of competences between 
the EU and the Member States in the specific case: On behalf of the EU (EU  competences, 
including actions in the framework of the CFSP when there is consensus in the Council), on 
behalf of the EU and its Member States (shared competences when there is agreement among 
Member States) and on behalf of the Member States (state compe tences when there is 
agreement among Member States). As such, the diplomatic representation of the EU varies 
depending on the international organization and also the specific issue being discussed. 
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Continued confusion of third states’ representatives is the consequence, since these are rarely 
experts on EU law and the division of competences among the actors in the network. 
Whereas  the  non-state  nature  of  the  EU  in  bilateral  relationships  is  not  a  formal 
problem, with mutual consent and reciprocity being the guiding norms of bilateral diplomacy, 
as expressed in diplomatic law.
77 In the case of international organizations, however, there is 
a potential clash between the law of the Organization and the nature of the EU that for 
instance impedes the EU Delegation from speaking. 
The cases of the WTO and the UN system illustrate well the general problem field. 
The EU is a member of the WTO alongside the Member States and within this organization, 
the Commission has acted like any other foreign policy actor.
78 DG Trade continues to exist 
separately from the EEAS, and it is the Trade Commissioner who represents the EU in the 
WTO ministerial conference, the highest authority within the WTO, whereas it is the EU 
representation under the EEAS that manages the daily intera ction with third states and is 
formally accredited as a diplomatic mission. Since the EU is a member of the WTO, there are 
few legal obstacles to EU activities within the organization, the challenge being mainly one of 
vertical coordination with the Member States and internal coordination between the EEAS 
and DG Trade. The practice is that the Member States generally refrain from speaking in the 
trade negotiations and instead focus on supervising and controlling what the EU mission 
does.
79  Therefore, thecoordination meetings among EU actors are mainly chaired by the 
rotating Presidency.
80 The opposite is more or less the case in the UN system, where the EU is 
not a member. Examples include the Human Rights Council, the ILO and the WHO, where 
the rotating Presidency speaks on behalf of the EU, but the EU Delegation chairs most of the 
coordination  meetings.
81  The  sheer  volume  of  coordination  meetings  among  the  actors 
involved in EU representation indicates the intense effort of coordination, but also the 
fragmentation of the EU as an actor, with 1300 coordinating meetings taking place in New 
York and 1000 in Geneva every year.
82 
With respect to the UN, it should be notes that the EU, in the form of its Member 
States, is the largest financial contributor to the UN, and that the EU has a special preference 
for participating in the EU system, given the EU’s multilateralist ideology.
83 Yet, given its 
non-state nature, the EU cannot be a member of the UN (with the exception of the FAO, as a 
separate  international  organization).  UNGA  assembly  65/276  gave  the  EU  an  enhanced 
observer status in the Assembly, with the right to speak, although not vote, to have access to 
all UN meetings, although with seating among the observers, and have its written proposals 
circulated  through  the  official  channels,
84  and has solved the main problem that the EU 
previously  had  in  the  UN,  namely  the  lack  of  formal  access  of  its  representatives.
85 
Nevertheless, the resolution also means that to vote, co-sponsor draft resolutions and propose 
candidates is strictly a matter for the UN member states, so in these cases, the rotating 
Presidency will continue to represent a common EU position, should it exist.
86 In the case of 
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the UN Security Council, the HR/VP has represented EU positions in case of agreement, but 
this remains a mainly symbolic aspect of EU actorness, that does not  encroach upon the 
French and UK status as permanent members. There is thus no role for the EU in the previous 
negotiations that is the basis of the UNSC’s work, and the EU as an organization is largely on 
the receiving end of the UNSC’s work.
87 
This situation also reveals that in international organizations where the EU is not a 
member, the situation is not straightforward, since any representation of the EU by a diplomat 
that does not represent a Member State of the international organization is highly problematic. 
The problem is not that the Member States do not authorise the EEAS to speak on the behalf 
of the entire EU, but that the constitution of the international organization does not allow it. 
There is a basic clash between the establishment of the EU as an international actor by its 
Member States and represented by the EEAS and the reality of international organizations, 
which  must  be  resolved  through  legal  innovation,  before  there  can  be  a  coherent  EU 
participation in international organizations through the EEAS.  
The general impression is that Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS do not 
clarify the matter of the diplomatic representation of the EU in international organizations, but 
leaves the issue to loose informal arrangements and the flexibility of the actors involved,
88 as 
was the case before the Lisbon Treaty. 
5. Institutional innovation and the EU’s international strategy
89 
The Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS represent a small revolution in EU 
diplomacy. The intention was clearly to increase the efficiency of EU diplomacy and make 
the EU more ‘state-like’ as a diplomatic actor, thereby allowing it to defend its interests more 
effectively. Still, the main obstacle to a coherent and unitary diplomatic representation has not 
been removed with the Lisbon Treaty: The sui generis nature of the EU between federal state 
and international organization and the resulting network organisation of its diplomacy, where 
the EEAS continue to coexist with the diplomatic services of the 28 sovereign Member States. 
What has changed is the coordination mechanisms within the network and a less complex and 
more  clear-cut  and  visible  international  representation,  which  undoubtedly  helps  the  EU 
reconstruct its image as a more Westphalian-state-like actor. With this reservation made, it is 
nevertheless clear that the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS constitute a strategic shift in EU 
diplomacy.  
The  main  identity  of  the  EU  as  a  diplomatic  actor  is  that  of  existing  as  a  post-
sovereign solution to the dilemmas and problems of the Westphalian international system,
90 in 
contrast to Westphalian norms of territoriality and sovereignty.
91 The basic construction is 
that the historical experiences of E uropean countries have shown the limited capacity of 
Westphalian diplomacy to solve the problems caused by the competitive coexistence of 
sovereign states. 
Until recently, it can therefore be argued, the main impact of EU diplomacy has been 
structural in nature. Keukeleire’s concept of structural diplomacy relates mainly to the EU 
strategic objective of transforming the internal structures of other states in the international 
system, particularly the neighbouring states, so that they resemble the Member States of the 
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EU.
92 However, European Union diplomacy is based on a further causal idea of a structural 
nature: not only the need for the transformation of the internal structures of other states, but 
also the need for the transformation of the dominant social  structures of diplomacy in the 
international system towards the institutionalisation and legalisation of interaction. This way, 
major political changes are achieved through changing the basic structures of the international 
system, in stark contrast to the dominant idea in Westphalian diplomacy, which assumes the 
inevitable existence of the structural condition of anarchy and which considers a balance of 
power among sovereigns a source of peace and stability. The logic of EU diplomacy points to 
both structural transformations being necessary in order to overcome the alienation that 
characterises the Westphalian system and its inadequate models for coexistence; hegemony or 
balancing. The creation of an international order based on effective international ins titutions 
is an explicit objective of the 2003  European Security Strategy and constructed as the only 
source of EU peace and prosperity. And the objectives of norm diffusion and structural 
transformation remain in the Lisbon Treaty.
93 
As such, the main impact of EU international agency was hitherto not to be found in 
the content of its interaction, but in its form, i.e. in its diplomacy,
94 in that it worked to 
recreate the foundations of the EU model of peaceful coexistence in its relations with other 
states and regions. Whether the EU will ultimately be successful in exporting its model is of 
course highly doubtful, although the increased interdependence and shared destiny of all 
states in an increasingly interconnected and ecologically fragile world seem to  resemble ever 
more the intra-European conditions when the model was first created.
95 
The  organization  of  the  EU  as  a  network  actor and  the internal  distribution  of 
competences among the various actors is not a great obstacle in this respect, since the foreign 
policy content that the EU transmits through its diplomatic practices is primarily universal 
values and only to a lesser extent specific material interests (for the defence of which the 
network organization is a great problem). This is again the simple result of the lack of internal 
agreement  about  which  interests  to  defend.  This  lack  of  strong  material  interests  to  be 
defended  internationally  in  relations  with  third  states,  has  allowed  the  structural  network 
diplomacy to function, since it has allowed for the form of interaction to be more important 
than the specific content in relations with third states, i.e. its diplomacy to be more important 
than its foreign policy.  
As a new kind of actor in the international system, it is very significant that the EU 
does not break with Westphalian micro-practices, but instead tries to copy them to the greatest 
extent possible and adapt its network organisation to function more efficiently within the 
framework constituted by existing international diplomatic law. The 1961 Vienna Convention 
on  Diplomatic  Relations
96  and  the  related  customary  law  associated  with  the  classical 
Westphalian states system remain the legal basis for diplomatic interaction in the international 
system. This suggests that a fundamental condition in the international system for a political 
entity is the lack of alternatives to Westphalian diplomatic practices, at least for if unwilling 
to use violence. 
Particularly the EU’s difficult participation in international organizations reveals the 
isomorphic pressure and problems that the current functioning of the international system and 
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international diplomatic law exercises upon the EU. If the EU were more Westphalian in 
terms of organization and of being more coherent and consistent, it could participate on a 
more equal footing with other powerful actors, and it would gain greater influence in the 
world. This alternative ‘euro-nationalist’ construction sees the ideal European Union as a 
unitary  actor  speaking  with  one  voice  and  being  able  to  effectively  defend  the  material 
interests of the Union. This line of reasoning is evident in many current policy debates, not 
least  those  relating  to  the  functioning  of  the  EEAS,  where  the  content  is  clearly  more 
important than the form, in a reversal of earlier logics.  
In this sense, the necessity for institutional innovation in EU diplomacy can be seen as 
a result of an ideological shift with respect to the EU’s global role. It is still too early to 
clearly estimate the impact of the establishment of the EEAS in this respect, but it seems clear 
that it is motivated by a perception of the content (interests) being more important than the 
form (structural impact of diplomacy), meaning that the EU is in a process of downplaying 
the element of raison de syst￨me which has been a key characteristic of its diplomacy so far, 
to  the  benefit  of  an  EU-level  raison  “d’union.”  This  tendency  is  also  reflected  in  the 
sanctions  policy  as  referred  to  above,  where  geopolitical  concerns  tend  to  triumph  the 
normative objectives of promoting democracy and human rights, as argued above. 
6. Conclusion 
EU diplomacy before the Treaty of Lisbon was plagued by horizontal and vertical 
incoherence stemming from the distribution of competences between the Union and Member 
States that led to supranational and intergovernmental forms of diplomatic representation by a 
multitude of actors organised in a network characterised by its diffuse structures of authority 
and legitimacy and an extensive lack of legal clarity.  
The Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS alleviates some of these problems, whereas others 
remain. The main obstacle to a coherent and unitary diplomatic representation has not been 
removed with the Lisbon Treaty: The sui generis nature of the EU between federal state and 
international organization and the resulting network organisation of its diplomacy, where the 
EEAS continue to coexist with the diplomatic services of the 28 sovereign Member States. 
What has changed is the coordination mechanisms within the network and a less complex and 
more  clear-cut  and  visible  international  representation,  which  undoubtedly  helps  the  EU 
reconstruct its image as a more Westphalian-state-like actor. Also, the non-state nature of the 
EU  continues  to  present  serious  problems  to  a  coherent  representation  in  international 
organizations, even when political agreement exists within the EU.  
In Brussels, the central administration of the EEAS now coordinates all policy areas, 
and even though the Commission still does internationally relevant work, the HR/VP is at the 
pinnacle of all bureaucratic structures, thereby having the potential to greatly improve the 
horizontal coherence of EU diplomacy. Abroad, what has fundamentally changed with the 
Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS is the simplification of the network, with the disappearance of 
the role of the Presidency diplomatic mission in CFSP areas. Now the Delegations represent 
the Union as a whole and across policy areas, so that the divide between supranational and 
intergovernmental  policy  areas  is  now  internal  to  the  EEAS.  The  real  impact  of  the 
institutional  innovation  still  remains  to  be  seen,  because  it  will  depend  not  only  on  the 
changed formal set-up, but of how the actors involved adopt new coordination practices that 
will allow the EU to have a unified representation as an actor. This again depends on the 
socialisation dynamics between staff coming from the Commission, the Council Secretariat 
and, not least, the diplomatic services of the Member States.  
Another main finding of the paper is that the institutional innovations indicate the 
consolidation of a strategic shift in EU diplomacy that has been on-going several years. The 
changes are for EU diplomacy to be more efficient and coherent, thereby enabling a more Steffen Bay RASMUSSEN    799 
 
assertive defence of EU interests on the international scene. This nevertheless represents a 
break with previous structural notions of diplomacy and a return to more Westphalian modes 
of conceiving international relations. This strategic shift towards the paradigm of the defence 
of  interest  in  a  competitive  logic  with  other  actors,  as  evidenced  by  the  EU’s  efforts  to 
become more state-like as a diplomatic actor is not unproblematic. If the Westphalian state as 
an organizational form was and is a problem for the peaceful coexistence of peoples, the 
recreation of the state at the European level cannot be a solution.
97 Of course, a more positive 
interpretation of the strategic shift is also possible. In a different perspective, thus, the 
institutional innovations analysed in this paper simple mean that the EU is succe ssfully 
adapting to the isomorphic pressures exercised by existing diplomatic culture and practices in 
the international system generally and as such is advancing in the process coming to terms 
with the realities of international relations. In effect, the  institutional innovations are mere 
indicators that the EU is ‘maturing’ as an international actor. 
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